Exceptional times, or simply a reflection of excessive fiscal dimes?

18 November, 2024
By Brett Lewthwaite

Sustained success and longevity in markets is seldom a function of luck, but rather the result of rigorous work, unwavering principles, and a deep commitment to clients. The investing landscape is constantly changing due to shifts in the global economic landscape, advancements in technology, or geopolitical changes. Likewise, a vital component of our investment process is a focus on constant refinement, enhancement, and evolution. In line with this, we have recently evolved our Strategic Forum, which will now be held twice a year, providing both an outlook for the calendar year as well as a mid-year review.

Introduction

2024 started with debate about whether the aggressive policy tightening of 2022 would lead to a recession. However, the narrative soon evolved to include speculation that interest rates would remain higher for longer amid a new artificial intelligence (AI) technological revolution and era of fiscal dominance. This view essentially became uniform market consensus right at the time almost all major global central banks started reducing interest rates – so much for consensus thinking. In reality, 2024 saw modest growth for most major global economies, with the US being the primary exception in terms of both economic growth and equity market performance. Indeed, the year appears to be closing with another prevailing narrative: the US economy as the envy of the world – experiencing a period of exceptional growth, coinciding with a potentially decisive general election.

US exceptionalism? For exceptional reasons

The US economy: The envy of the world? The prevailing market narrative suggests that the US may be experiencing a period of exceptional growth. With equity markets hitting new highs and credit spreads reaching new tights, financial markets are increasingly embracing the view of relentless US exceptionalism. Yet, upon closer examination, what is genuinely exceptional is the ongoing, arguably excessive fiscal looseness that the US continues to pursue, with US government deficits running higher than ~7% of GDP again throughout 2024. Through this lens it is little wonder that economic growth remains resilient and continues to propel the perception of ‘it’s different this time.’ By way of being exceptional, it is true that no other major economic region is running fiscal deficits close to that level. Exceptional times? Or just exceptionally loose policy? This raises a key question about the sustainability of the US fiscal deficit and whether fiscal looseness will continue post-election, into 2025 and beyond.

In our last Strategic Forum, we discussed the very real post-pandemic geopolitical shift from globalisation toward a greater emphasis on national priorities, particularly in the US. This included 1) increased investment in national security, 2) the dependable supply of essential needs, such as food, energy, and health; and 3) the paramount need to stay ahead in the AI technological race and its influence on government sponsorship of all things infrastructure related to support this goal. It is this geopolitical shift, executed via programs such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and CHIPS and Science Act, that have contributed to the US fiscal deficit, culminating to form one of the first genuine industrial policy programs in decades and adding weight to the idea that the era ahead will be characterised by fiscal dominance. That being said, it is intriguing that the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI®) indicates an ongoing contractionary environment for US manufacturers.

However, this is only half the story. The other half is the debt dynamics of the US. US debt levels continue to climb at pace given the ongoing fiscal deficits, and increasingly due to the cost of servicing them, as seen in Figures 1 and 2. Interest payments on debt are now the number one government expenditure item, and at the current level of official interest rates, they are forecast to climb even higher. When combined with the reality that both political parties appear indifferent and even additive to the current debt dynamics, many market commentators are increasingly calling into question the sustainability of the current debt trajectory and its inevitable spillover into fixed income and currency markets.

Source: Macrobond (November 2024).

Many are again asking who will buy all the bonds needed to fund this fiscal position, pressuring yields higher. This concern is most visible in the recent movement in the price of gold, as seen in Figure 3. While we agree that US debt dynamics do appear to be on an unsustainable path – and this is likely to cause episodic bouts of volatility particularly in the long end of bond markets – we believe a more likely path forward is one where interest rates are lowered materially, with the US Federal Reserve (Fed) returning to act as the buyer (or funder) of last resort, ultimately supressing volatility and deferring the debt sustainability question even further into the future. That may sound counterintuitive, but as we like to say, don’t focus on what should happen, prepare for what will happen. In this case, prepare for lower rates and more liquidity, even as this further erodes the appeal of fiat money and elevates the appeal of hard assets like gold.

Source: Bloomberg (November 2024).

The structural inflation debate remains

Against this backdrop of growing debt and deficits, it is understandable that the debate surrounding the potential for a new era of structurally higher inflation continues to persist. The inflation discussion also garnered significant focus in our Strategic Forum. Our analysis suggests that an approach focussed separately on the shorter-term cyclical inflation pulse and the longer-term structural trajectory is sensible. Our previous research indicating inflation would continue to fall throughout 2024 fared well. A detailed review of the evidence in October reaffirms our conviction that the near-term influences of inflation continue to point to a further cyclical softening of inflation as we head into the first half of 2025, as demonstrated in Figures 4 and 5.

Source: Macrobond (November 2024). FOMC: Federal Open Market Committee.

The longer-term structural environment deserves much more debate, leading to lower conviction. Particularly given the re-election of President Trump and the associated ongoing fiscal looseness, with the potential to ignite the structural narrative around higher inflation. The re-emergence of heightened concern in this regard could quickly influence financial markets, especially the longer end of the US yield curve. With that said, it is worthwhile revisiting both sides of the structural outlook for inflation.

In brief, the case for operating in a structurally higher inflation environment hinges on a few key narratives:

• The recency bias of the fading, yet severe, inflation episode and the lingering effects in the global economy, resulting in heightened sensitivity to any further spikes in inflation. The adage that ‘once the inflation genie is out of the bottle it is very difficult to put back in’ remains front of mind.
• The seemingly broad acceptance of prolonged excessive fiscal looseness, instigated by the ‘break-in-case-of-emergency’ situation the pandemic represented. This led to a greater willingness and comfort among elected governments to utilise ongoing fiscal looseness, which has been sustained by the shift in national priorities toward domestic needs and security. When viewed alongside the commencement of global central bank easing, many may conclude this risks overheating economies and thereby fanning the flames of inflation.
• Some commentators point to ongoing geopolitical friction and de-globalisation, with the associated onshoring and friendshoring, as structural inflation forces. Likewise, inflationary fears are also attached to the energy transition and associated 'green-flation.'
• Lastly, the outcome of the preceding monetary policy era and globalisation era was widespread inequality, which suggests that that underlying societal influences are shifting and will likely influence policymakers to once again engage in policies that are more tilted towards inflation.

On the other hand, several drivers are likely to exert disinflationary influences on the global economy:

• Debt is now much greater than in 2007/2008. High debt (public or private) does not and cannot thrive in a higher inflation world, with the ensuing higher cost of capital quickly impacting the indebted components of economies.
• Digitalisation is accelerating at an exponential pace. AI is effectively the discovery of an unlimited new workforce and is a powerful, albeit less-discussed, deflationary force.
• Demographics remain the same. Aging populations tend to be disinflationary (as seen in Japan) and not to mention the infinite supply of new AI/bot colleagues.

Ultimately, this debate could evolve in either direction. Our approach is to favour following the cyclical direction of inflation while keeping an eye on policymakers and their potential to fuel the flames of the structurally higher inflation narrative. On balance, we think the outlook for inflation is unlikely to be a structurally higher. The powerful forces of both digitalisation and debt dynamics are individually deflationary. In combination, they have the potential for significant societal changes, and herein lies the potential trigger that could indeed lead to a higher inflation environment.

Structurally, the contained environment continues – at least for now

For years, we have written about the concept of the ‘contained environment’ with policymakers being forced to act to alleviate crises, time and time again. We had thought that inflation would break the cycle, although as 2024 ends, this increasingly appears not to have occurred.

The pattern of the ‘containment’ of risk or volatility first emerged via the trend of lower and lower interest rates, then zero rates, and then unthinkable levels of quantitative easing (QE) and liquidity. Now, it seems to remain intact by a shift towards fiscal policy and potentially endless government spending (fiscal dominance). Thus, the overarching approach of supressing volatility in financial markets continues. While this sounds overly simple, an approach that supresses volatility or risk in financial markets does not resolve it; it simply transfers the instability elsewhere. This can be seen in the unintended consequences of widespread societal inequality, concentrated narrow financial markets with a few big winners (e.g. the Magnificent seven), and increasing geopolitical tension.

In this light, narratives like ‘higher for longer’ are not supported by simple financial maths, unless an event triggers the transferred risk or instability to erupt in conflict - whether that be internal social inter-generational or external geopolitical - both of which are non-zero probabilities and are rising gradually. Recall that in 2007, 5.25% interest rates created the great financial crisis, and now in 2024 we have debt levels that are much higher, with interest rates that are again around 5%. And yet, market pricing suggests everyone believes there is no possibility that high debt levels amid high interest rates could lead to a recession. Further, the longer higher rates persist, the more this dynamic will accelerate the concerns relating to debt sustainability. While it could be argued that this should happen, it is more likely that higher rates do matter, and as such the opposite will happen – there could be a notable shift to lower interest rates and more liquidity to ‘contain’ the associated volatility.

Where does it all end? Well, that is for a future discussion. To offer a hint, the answer is either in conflict – internal societal or external between nations – or in massive structural reform of areas such as exceptionally profitable ‘big tech’. Such reform would likely benefit society greatly, though it may not be favourable for the very high valuations of the mega-tech sector, which play a significant (currently upwardly) influential role in most global indices. However, we have not reached that point yet. The pattern of increasing frequency of shocks and widening fault lines, although contained for at least the foreseeable future, remains intact. Countries like Japan have been following this playbook for nearly three decades. Understanding rapid technological advancement and the policy response to it is key to understanding how long the ongoing ‘contained environment’ will continue. When it comes to technology and all things AI, the value of knowledge is falling towards zero. With an apparently unlimited new workforce coming online, none of us quite know what that means, good or bad. Exceptional times indeed.

Investment implications

As monetary policy is currently restrictive with real rates notably positive, interest rates should continue to fall. Greater fiscal looseness likely results in increased volatility in long maturity bonds, and this will need to be supressed. Putting those two together, our analysis favours owning solid levels of duration in portfolios and adding on moves higher in yield. We remain cautious on credit and risk assets, primarily due to current heightened valuations, although we seek to add on the inevitable volatility episodes given our view that policymakers continue to exhibit a keenness to contain the environment and support it when needed.

To summarise – interest rates and bond yields are likely to move lower, and abundant liquidity conditions will likely remain or be afforded as needed, encouraging a mindset of ‘buying dips’ in higher-risk assets. Meanwhile, it appears increasingly sensible to hold real assets, including property, infrastructure, and yes, gold.

• Rates: Following clear signals from central bank officials that further easing is likely, bond markets have moved to price in historically aggressive easing cycles by most major central banks in the coming quarters (with the notable exception of the Bank of Japan, for which further hikes are priced). While this pricing may limit the extent to which bond markets can ultimately rally, the fact that central banks have only recently commenced easing cycles should limit the extent of any selloffs. We therefore expect higher yields to represent a buying opportunity, while Fed easing and potential supply should pressure yield curves steeper. With superior relative valuations and fundamentals in European and Australian markets, we expect these fixed income securities to perform better than those in other developed world geographies.
• Credit: While spreads are already tight, a number of positive factors are expected to see credit trade in a relatively narrow range in the medium-term. With monetary and fiscal policy set to provide more support to the growth outlook than was earlier expected, fundamentals should be supported. Moreover, while spreads are tight, all-in yields remain high relative to history, and expectations of positive total returns should drive demand. We have a favourable view on sectors such as critical infrastructure, including electric, energy, and domestic banks. We prefer BBB-rated credit over A-rated credit given event risk, with our BBB exposure being in relatively defensive sectors.
• Structured securities: Lower interest rates and a stable economic outlook is expected to be supportive of structured securities fundamentals. Mortgage-backed securities spreads have been range-bound year-to-date, but remain at attractive levels over investment grade corporates. On the commercial side, the prevailing ‘no landing’ narrative is helping to avoid the worst-case scenario for the sector. We see potential opportunities in high credit quality tranches at relatively wide spreads. Collateralised loan obligation fundamentals are also benefitting from lower interest rates and valuations are screening attractive to investment grade corporates.
• Emerging markets (EM) debt: EMs have continued their strong post-pandemic economic run. GDP growth remains above that of developed markets, and the disinflationary trajectory remains intact. Outside of China, EM government balance sheets are also looking healthy compared to their developed market counterparts, which is exemplified by a large proportion of positive ratings outlooks. Given this resilience, we view the structural spread pick-up in EM as currently offering fair value and remain strategically neutral, though we continue to watch supportive technicals and opportunities in EM local currency bonds.
• Currency: Our view is that US dollar weakness will continue, driven by the Fed easing cycle and fading global recession fears (with the market having less demand for a safe haven currency), though political outcomes in the US pose a risk to this view. Conversely, we see pro cyclical currencies benefitting the most from this weakness – such as the Australian dollar, which is supported by a lagging monetary policy easing cycle and increasing Chinese stimulus measures. Elsewhere we are also positive on the Japanese yen as rate differentials continue to normalise. We have less conviction on other major currencies (notably the euro and British pound), as their central banks are increasingly easing rates in lockstep with the Fed.

Authors

[3998632]

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) are as of the date indicated and may change based on market and other conditions. The accuracy of the content and its relevance to your client’s particular circumstances is not guaranteed. 

This market commentary has been prepared for general informational purposes by the team, who are part of Macquarie Asset Management (MAM), the asset management business of Macquarie Group (Macquarie), and is not a product of the Macquarie Research Department. This market commentary reflects the views of the team and statements in it may differ from the views of others in MAM or of other Macquarie divisions or groups, including Macquarie Research. This market commentary has not been prepared to comply with requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research and is accordingly not subject to any prohibition on dealing ahead of the dissemination of investment research.

Nothing in this market commentary shall be construed as a solicitation to buy or sell any security or other product, or to engage in or refrain from engaging in any transaction. Macquarie conducts a global full-service, integrated investment banking, asset management, and brokerage business. Macquarie may do, and seek to do, business with any of the companies covered in this market commentary. Macquarie has investment banking and other business relationships with a significant number of companies, which may include companies that are discussed in this commentary, and may have positions in financial instruments or other financial interests in the subject matter of this market commentary. As a result, investors should be aware that Macquarie may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this market commentary. In preparing this market commentary, we did not take into account the investment objectives, financial situation or needs of any particular client. You should not make an investment decision on the basis of this market commentary. Before making an investment decision you need to consider, with or without the assistance of an adviser, whether the investment is appropriate in light of your particular investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances.

Macquarie salespeople, traders and other professionals may provide oral or written market commentary, analysis, trading strategies or research products to Macquarie’s clients that reflect opinions which are different from or contrary to the opinions expressed in this market commentary. Macquarie’s asset management business (including MAM), principal trading desks and investing businesses may make investment decisions that are inconsistent with the views expressed in this commentary. There are risks involved in investing. The price of securities and other financial products can and does fluctuate, and an individual security or financial product may even become valueless. International investors are reminded of the additional risks inherent in international investments, such as currency fluctuations and international or local financial, market, economic, tax or regulatory conditions, which may adversely affect the value of the investment. This market commentary is based on information obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but we do not make any representation or warranty that it is accurate, complete or up to date. We accept no obligation to correct or update the information or opinions in this market commentary. Opinions, information, and data in this market commentary are as of the date indicated on the cover and subject to change without notice. No member of the Macquarie Group accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct, indirect, consequential or other loss arising from any use of this market commentary and/or further communication in relation to this market commentary. Some of the data in this market commentary may be sourced from information and materials published by government or industry bodies or agencies, however this market commentary is neither endorsed or certified by any such bodies or agencies. This market commentary does not constitute legal, tax accounting or investment advice. Recipients should independently evaluate any specific investment in consultation with their legal, tax, accounting, and investment advisors. Past performance is not indicative of future results. 

This market commentary may include forward looking statements, forecasts, estimates, projections, opinions and investment theses, which may be identified by the use of terminology such as “anticipate”, “believe”, “estimate”, “expect”, “intend”, “may”, “can”, “plan”, “will”, “would”, “should”, “seek”, “project”, “continue”, “target” and similar expressions. No representation is made or will be made that any forward-looking statements will be achieved or will prove to be correct or that any assumptions on which such statements may be based are reasonable. A number of factors could cause actual future results and operations to vary materially and adversely from the forward-looking statements. Qualitative statements regarding political, regulatory, market and economic environments and opportunities are based on the team’s opinion, belief and judgment. 

Past performance does not guarantee future results. 

Diversification may not protect against market risk. 

Fixed income securities are subject to credit risk, which is the risk of loss of principal or loss of a financial reward stemming from a borrower’s failure to repay a loan or otherwise meet a contractual obligation. Credit risk arises whenever a borrower expects to use future cash flows to pay a current debt. Investors are compensated for assuming credit risk by way of interest payments from the borrower or issuer of a debt obligation. Credit risk is closely tied to the potential return of an investment, the most notable being that the yields on bonds correlate strongly to their perceived credit risk.

Fixed income securities are also subject to interest rate risk, which is the risk that the prices of fixed income securities will increase as interest rates fall and decrease as interest rates rise. Interest rate changes are influenced by a number of factors, such as government policy, monetary policy, inflation expectations, and the supply and demand of securities. Fixed income securities with longer maturities or duration generally are more sensitive to interest rate changes.

Fixed income securities may also be subject to prepayment risk, which is the risk that the principal of a bond that is held by a portfolio will be prepaid prior to maturity at the time when interest rates are lower than what the bond was paying. A portfolio may then have to reinvest that money at a lower interest rate.

Market risk is the risk that all or a majority of the securities in a certain market – like the stock market or bond market – will decline in value because of factors such as adverse political or economic conditions, future expectations, investor confidence, or heavy institutional selling. 

International investments entail risks including fluctuation in currency values, differences in accounting principles, or economic or political instability. Investing in emerging markets can be riskier than investing in established foreign markets due to increased volatility, lower trading volume, and higher risk of market closures. In many emerging markets, there is substantially less publicly available information and the available information may be incomplete or misleading. Legal claims are generally more difficult to pursue. 

Currency risk is the risk that fluctuations in exchange rates between the US dollar and foreign currencies and between various foreign currencies may cause the value of an investment to decline. The market for some (or all) currencies may from time to time have low trading volume and become illiquid, which may prevent an investment from effecting positions or from promptly liquidating unfavourable positions in such markets, thus subjecting the investment to substantial losses.

Credit risk is the risk of loss of principal or loss of a financial reward stemming from a borrower’s failure to repay a loan or otherwise meet a contractual obligation. Credit risk arises whenever a borrower expects to use future cash flows to pay a current debt. Investors are compensated for assuming credit risk by way of interest payments from the borrower or issuer of a debt obligation. Credit risk is closely tied to the potential return of an investment, the most notable being that the yields on bonds correlate strongly to their perceived credit risk.

Liquidity risk is the possibility that securities cannot be readily sold within seven days at approximately the price at which a fund has valued them. 

Investment strategies that hold securities issued by companies principally engaged in the infrastructure industry have greater exposure to the potential adverse economic, regulatory, political, and other changes affecting such entities. 

Infrastructure companies are subject risks including increased costs associated with capital construction programs and environmental regulations, surplus capacity, increased competition, availability of fuel at reasonable prices, energy conservation policies, difficulty in raising capital, and increased susceptibility to terrorist acts or political actions.

Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and assetbacked securities (ABS) are subject to credit risk and interest rate risk and may also be subject to prepayment risk and extension risk. In addition, MBS and ABS may decline in value, become more volatile, face difficulties in valuation, or experience reduced liquidity due to changes in interest rates or general economic conditions. Certain MBS, such as collateralized mortgage obligations, real estate mortgage investment conduits, and stripped MBS may be more susceptible to these risks than other MBS.

Additional Tier 1 (AT1) Bonds serve as capital instruments that banks utilize to augment their core equity base. Unlike conventional bonds, AT1 Bonds are perpetual and thus, the investors are not paid the principal amount.

The CHIPS (Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors) and Science Act of 2022 was signed into law by President Joe Biden on Aug. 9, 2022. The law received bipartisan approval and strong support from the research and business communities. The act appropriated approximately $52 billion to support semiconductor research and manufacturing. In addition, approximately $200 billion was allocated for investments in semiconductor and other scientific research, technology, education, and training, with a significant portion of the appropriations – along with incentive tax credits for business – intended to fund the federal share of publicprivate partnerships. An additional $20 million appropriation was provided to enhance security for members of the U.S. Supreme Court and their families.

Duration measures a bond’s sensitivity to interest rates, by indicating the approximate percentage of change in a bond or bond fund’s price given a 1% change in interest rates.

Firendshoring, a cousin of “reshoring” and “onshoring” and a sibling to “nearshoring,” is shorthand for the practice of relocating supply chains to countries where the risk of disruption from political chaos is low. 

The global financial crisis (GFC) refers to the period of extreme stress in global financial markets and banking systems between mid-2007 and early 2009.

The Group of Seven (G-7) is an intergovernmental organization made up of the world’s largest developed economies: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Government leaders of these countries meet periodically to address international economic and monetary issues, with each member taking over the presidency on a rotating basis.

Inflation is the rate at which the general level of prices for goods and services is rising, and, subsequently, purchasing power is falling. Central banks attempt to stop severe inflation, along with severe deflation, in an attempt to keep the excessive growth of prices to a minimum.

The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (H.R. 5376) was designed to reduce the deficit and lower inflation while investing in domestic energy production and lowering healthcare drug costs. The bill became law with President Biden’s signature on Aug. 16, 2022. In essence, the law is a scaled-down version of the Build Back Better Act proposed by the Biden administration in 2021.

“The Magnificent Seven” refers to a group of seven high-performing and influential stocks in the technology sector, borrowing from the meaning of a powerful group. Bank of America analyst Michael Hartnett coined the phrase in 2023 when commenting on the seven companies commonly recognized for their market dominance, their technological impact, and their changes to consumer behavior and economic trends: Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta Platforms, Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Tesla.

Quantitative easing (QE) is a government monetary policy used to increase the money supply by buying government securities or other securities from the market. Quantitative easing increased the money supply by flooding financial institutions with capital in an effort to promote increased lending and liquidity.

Recession is a period of temporary economic decline during which trade and industrial activity are reduced, generally identified by a fall in GDP in two successive quarters

A Treasury yield refers to the effective yearly interest rate the US government pays on money it borrows to raise capital through selling Treasury bonds, also referred to as Treasury notes or Treasury bills depending on maturity length.

The yield curve is a line that plots the interest rates, at a set point in time, of bonds having equal credit quality, but differing maturity dates. The most frequently reported yield curve compares the 3-month, 2-year, 5-year, and 30-year US Treasury debt. This yield curve is used as a benchmark for other debt in the market, such as mortgage rates or bank lending rates. It is also used to predict changes in economic output and growth.

The shape of the yield curve is closely scrutinized because it helps to give an idea of future interest rate change and economic activity. There are three main types of yield curve shapes: normal, inverted and flat (or humped). A normal yield curve is one in which longer maturity bonds have a higher yield compared to shorter-term bonds due to the risks associated with time. An inverted yield curve is one in which the shorter-term yields are higher than the longer-term yields, which can be a sign of upcoming recession. A flat (or humped) yield curve is one in which the shorterand longer-term yields are very close to each other, which is also a predictor of an economic transition. The slope of the yield curve is also seen as important: the greater the slope, the greater the gap between short- and long-term rates.

Yield curve inversion is when coupon payments on shorter-term Treasury bonds exceed the interest paid on longer-term bonds.

ZIRP is a method of stimulating growth while keeping interest rates close to zero. The governing central bank can no longer reduce interest rates under this policy, rendering conventional monetary policy ineffective. Unconventional monetary policy such as quantitative easing is used to increase the monetary base as a result.

The Institute for Supply Management (ISM®) Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI®) is an indicator of the economic health of the manufacturing sector. The Manufacturing PMI is a composite of five indices with equal weights: New Orders, Production, Employment, Supplier Deliveries, and Inventories. A Manufacturing PMI reading above 50% indicates that the manufacturing economy is generally expanding; below 50% indicates that it is generally contracting. 

The S&P 500® Index measures the performance of 500 mostly large-cap stocks weighted by market value and is often used to represent performance of the US stock market.

The US Industrial Production Index (IPI) measures the real output of all relevant establishments located in the United States, regardless of their ownership, but not those located in U.S. territories.

Index performance returns do not reflect any management fees, transaction costs or expenses. Indices are unmanaged and one cannot invest directly in an index. 

Economic trend information is sourced from Bloomberg unless otherwise noted.

Macquarie Group, its employees and officers may act in different, potentially conflicting, roles in providing the financial services referred to in this document. The Macquarie Group entities may from time to time act as trustee, administrator, registrar, custodian, investment manager or investment advisor, representative or otherwise for a product or may be otherwise involved in or with, other products and clients which have similar investment objectives to those of the products described herein. Due to the conflicting nature of these roles, the interests of Macquarie Group may from time to time be inconsistent with the Interests of investors. Macquarie Groupentities may receive remuneration as a result of acting in these roles. Macquarie Group has conflict of interest policies which aim to manage conflicts of interest.

All third-party marks cited are the property of their respective owners